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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
body politic and 
corporate, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY REDEVELOP-
MENT and MURRAY CITY, a 
municipal corporation, 
VAUGHN SOFFE, JACK DEMANN 
and JACK FIT'~'S, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 15755 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by Salt Lake County to 
contest the validity of the adoption of a redevelopment plan 
by Murray City, defendants-respondents, pursuant to the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act, Chapter 19, Utah Code Anno-
tated §11-19-1, et. seq. 1953, as amended 1971, and to 
challenge the validity of Murray City Ordinance No. 458 
enacted to implement said Utah Neighborhood Development Act 
on procedural and constitutional grounds. The Plaintiffs 
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sought to have the Murray City Neighborhood Development Plan 
be declared null, void and of no effect. In the alter-
native, it was requested that defendants-respondents be 
required to redraw the project area to conform with the 
requirements of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court ruled in this case on two different 
occasions. Initially, defendants-respondents filed a 
motion for summary judgment and were granted a partial 
summary judgment for all issues except two: 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence of "blight" 
upon which the Murray Redev2lopment Agency could 
base its determination that blight existed in 
the project area; and 
2. Whether the boundary areas of the project area 
comport with the description given in the plan 
and the public notice. (Transcript at 163) 
Plaintiff-appellant filed a Notice Preserving 
plaintiff's Right to Appeal in regard to this partial grant 
(Transcript 167-168). The plaintiff-appellant and defendants-
respondents then each filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The motion of defendants-respondents was granted without 
specified reasons (Transcript at 258-259). Summary Judgment 
was entered on the 5th day of March, 1978 (Transcript at 
270-271). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Westside Action Committee, a coalition of 
property owners in the proposed redevelopment area, acting 
as amicus curiae, seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
trial court and requests that the Court enter a judgment in 
favor of plaintiff-appellant and against defendants-responden 
determining that the Murray City Ordinance adopting and 
implementing the Neighborhood Development Plan was not 
enacted in accordance with Utah Neighborhood Development 
Act, Utah Code Annotated §11-19-1, et seq. and is therefore 
null, void and of no effect; or alternatively, require the 
Murray City Redevelopment Agency to redraw its project area 
to be in conformance with the Utah Neighborhood Development 
Act, in particular, Sections 11-19-9 and 11-19-2(10). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Murray City Board of Commissioners appointed 
the Murray City Redevelopment Agency with three of the 
Commissioners serving as the chief policy body of that 
agency. 
On June l, 1976, a preliminary plan for redevelop-
ment in Murray City was adopted by the Murray City Commission 
(Exhibit B) on the basis that said areas were ''blighted" 
areas. This plan appears to be based primarily on a 1976 
study, the Murray Core Area Downtown District Revitalization 
-3-
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Plan which dealt primarily with a small area from 4800 South 
to First Avenue (approximately 5050 South) on both sides of 
State Street. The Redevelopment Agency adopted the general 
plan and goals on July 1, 1976. A single notice was published 
in the Murray Eagle on July 20, 1976, showing hearing dates 
of August 23, 1976 and August 24, 1976 (Exhibit F). No 
hearing was held until September 6, 1976, (Minutes Exhibit 
D, Respondent's Brief at page 7). On August 27, August 31, 
September 2 and September 6, 1976, the City Commission 
caused a notice to be published in the Salt Lake Tribune 
stating the hearing would be held on September 6, 1976 
(Exhibit G). These four notices were s~read over an eleven 
day period. There is nothing in the record to verify 
defendants-respondent's statement that notice was sent to 
property owners on September 1, 1976 (Brief of Respondent at 
pages 7 and 8) and petitioning property owners did not 
receive such notice. 
On September 8, 1976, although none of the public 
was present, the Murray City Commission adopted Ordinance 
No. 453 accepting the Redevelopment Plan. 
On October 8, 1976, plaintiff-Appellant filed a 
Complaint in tbe District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, attacking the proposed redevelopment on several 
-4-
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grounds. Plaintiff-appellant's complaint raised numerous 
objections to the plan in its first cause of action, then in 
the second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action raised 
constitutional objections to the Utah Neighborhood Develop-
ment Act as applied factually to Salt Lake County (Trans-
cript 2-12). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
DEFENDANL'S-RESPONDEN'S BECAUSE THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN'S DETERMINATION OF BLIGHT 
WAS NOT STATUTORILY ADEQUATE. 
A redevelopment plan may not be enforced which 
does not comply with the provisions of the Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act, Utah Code Annotated §11-19-1, et seq. 
Section 11-19-9 of that act specifically requires that: 
A project area must be restricted to 
buildings, improvements or land which are 
detrimental or inimical to the public 
health. 
There has been no such restriction in this case. 
Two project areas have been outlined and there is nothing on 
the record tQ indicate that either has been restricted to 
"buildings, improvements or lands which are detrimental or 
inimical to the public health". 
The areas outlined for this project cannot be 
sustained as a blighted area. Although not all homes in a 
project area need meet the standard for blight, certainly 
-5-
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the majority should. Respondent's best evidence indicates 
that at best 5.31% of the buildings were beyond repair. 
(Exhibit #1). Assuming that the 5.31% figure can be sup-
ported it is, nevertheless, an insufficient basis on which 
to declare an area blighted. Allowing such a precedent to 
stand would mean that in any area of 20 homes, if one was 
"beyond repair" the entire area could be declared a re-
development project. If the 5.31% were not evenly dis-
tributed but were found in a single area, only that small 
area should be taken as a project area. 
Defendants-Respondents support their action by 
contending that blight is a process and must be viewed from 
that perspective (Respondents' Brief at 20). To use such a 
pre-determined point of view subverts the requirement of an 
objective standard and would sanction a determination of a 
process of blight in an area where the homes are in satis-
factory condition. Defendants-respondents could find 
occasional disrepair to be the "process of blight". Such a 
standard is no standard at all. 
Section 11-19-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
Every project area redevelopment plan shall 
be accompanied by a report containing: 
(1) the reasons for the selection of the 
project area; 
(2) a description of the physical, social 
and economic conditions existing in 
the area; ... 
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Murray City's failure to treat the two project areas separab 
statistically is a violation of this section. Unless 
analyzed separately, there is no reason to believe that any 
of the statistics accurately represent the extent of blight. 
Combining such area statistics does violence to the legis-
lature requirement that separate plans be made for each 
project area. 
Utilizing the powers of eminent domain for re-
development of such minimal need is an abuse of the legis-
lative grant of that power. Eminent domain is a harsh 
exercise of power and strict construction should apply. 
This Court recently held that the power of eminent domain is 
not to be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and, further 
that such a taking must be founded on public necessity, Salt 
Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Ut. 1977): 
The power of eminent domain is not to 
be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily 
and the courts possess full authority to 
determine the proper limits of the power 
to prevent abuses in its exercise, and 
litigants should, and do have great lati-
tude in conferring, dispositive functions 
upon the court as they clearly did in this 
instance. 
In circumstances similar to this case, the County was seeking 
to condemn 11 acres for a park and recreational areas and 
this Court held that the County did not establish public 
necessity. 
-7-
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In a similar case the Florida Supreme Court placed 
the burden on the condemning authority to establish public 
purpose and rea~onable necessity and held that the burden 
was n0t met. 
Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority, 
315 S. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975). In Baycol, the Fort Lauderdale 
Downtown Development Authority sought to condemn property by 
eminent domain for construction of a parking facility. 
Although the landowner's attack addressed the issue of bonds 
and the anticipated private use of the area, the Supreme 
Court of Florida addressed generally the power of eminent 
domain. The Court held that "a strict cor1'.otruction must be 
given against the agency asserting the power" of iminent 
domain, Id at 455. 
The standards fnr declaring an area blighted are 
stricter than tnose for condemnation for a public use. 
A determination of blight can never be sustained 
on grounds of a better use. It must be shown as a real 
hindrance to the city and incapable of elimination or im-
provement without public assistance, Sweetwater Valley 
Civic Assoc. v. National City, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859, 555 P.2d 
1099 ( 1976). Blight must be made on determination of the 
existing use and not a better use, Id. The project areas 
under consideration in the present case have not been shown 
-8-
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to be blighted areas and at most meet only the foregoing 
concept of optimum use and should not be sustained. 
This Court made clear in Ramoselli, supra, that 
the court has full power to determine the proper limits of a 
grant of legislative power to prevent abuse of exercise. 
This Court has the power to examine the evidence to deter-
mine if it was exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. Even 
assuming for the sake of argument that the areas may be 
found to be "blighted'' under the definition of the Utah 
Development Act, the provisions of §11-19-9 of that Act in 
its most limited interpretation requires that the condemnatic 
be restricted to "buildings, improvements, or land which are 
detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety or 
welfare," §11-19-9, Utah Code annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The deposition of Charles Clay indicates that several nice 
homes have been included. Any residence not found to be 
detrimental or inimical to public health should be excluded 
from the project area. The language of the statute clearly 
indicates an intent that the taking should be of the se-
lective type suggested by Nichols: 
Although acceptance of the "area" concept 
seems to preclude the omission of any parcel 
within the area, it has been said that where 
the taking is for the purpose of preventing 
the spread of blight and to conserve the 
basic character of a deteriorating area or 
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develop a new character, inoffensive parcels 
may be omitted from the taking or conversely, 
offensive parcels only may be taken on the 
theory that the remedial action need not 
await total deterioration. Vol. 2A, 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, §7.51561(1) 
Blight pg. 7-221. 
Thus the agency should at least be required to make a deter-
mination of houses to be omitted. The case should be 
remanded for this purpose. 
The Murray City Board of Commissioners have not 
shown that the project areas are blighted areas as defined 
by §11-19-2(10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: 
Characterized by the existence of buildings 
and structures used or i~tended to be used 
for residential, commerc~al, industrial, 
or other purposes, or any combination of 
such uses, which are unfit or unsafe to 
occupy for such purposes or are conducive 
to ill health, transmission of disease, 
infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, 
and crime because of any one of a combina-
tion of the following factors: 
Instead defendants-respondents have emphasized factors 
listed after this paragraph such as the irregular form and 
shape of lots [11-19-2(10) (g)] without demonstrating that 
the project areas meet the essential requirements set out 
above. 
Such evidence of blight as the City has presented 
is disputed by the petitioning area residents and its super-
ficiality is offensive to people who fear losing life long 
-10-
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homes. The finding that 5.37% of the homes were in less 
than rehabili~able condition was made on the basis of a 
window survey done by Mr. Watts (Watts deposition at 499). 
The studies used were not current and boundaries of the 
areas covered not the same as those of the project areas. 
The MARC Study, Murray Core J\.rea Downtown Revitalization 
Study and Neighborhood Development Plan do not pertain to 
the same boundaries. Such differences may well have signi-
ficant effects. 
The City has gone beyond the power granted by the 
Neighborhood Redevelopment Act first in applying it to an 
area which it cannot show to be blighted and second in 
extending project areas beyond buildings and land it claims 
to be blighted. The elderly and low income residents of the 
project areas who are petitioning this court should be 
protected from the enormous power granted by this act being 
used in such a capricious and arbitrary fashion. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS- RESPOtJDENTS BECAUSE THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PLAN WAS NOT DEVELOPED 
IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE GRANT 
OF AUTHORITY. 
A. The Murray City Commission did not comply with 
the requirements of Notice in Section 11-19-16 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
-11-
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Notice of public hearing - Contents. Notice 
of the public hearing on a project area re-
development plan shall be given by publication 
not less than once a week for four successive 
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation 
published in the county in which the plan 
lies. Utah Code Annotated §11-19-16. 
Although specific requirements are set out in the 
statute for adequate notice, the Murray City Commission did 
not comply. Three elements must be satisfied to meet the 
requirements of notice in this section: (1) it shall be not 
less than once a week, (2) it shall be for four successive 
weeks and (3) the publication shall be in a newspaper of 
general circulation. It must be inferred that each notice 
would give the same date, time, place and other pertinent 
information. To fail to require such would thwart the 
intent of noticeto give interested parties an opportunity to 
reply. 
The first attempt of notice by publication was 
made by the Murray City Commission on July 20, 1976, in a 
small weekly newspaper called the Murray Eagle. Publication 
there occurred once only and publicized the hearings dates 
as August 23, 1976 and August 24, 1976 (Exhibit F). Clearly 
this single publication did not meet the three statutory 
elements of sLfficient notice. The record attests to the 
fact that such hearings were never held and so these notices 
only served to confuse the situation. 
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The only other attempt to give notice by publi-
cation commenced on Friday, August 27, 1976, and was fol-
lowed by notice on Tuesday, August 31, 1976 then Thursday, 
September 2, 1976, and final publication on the date of the 
hearing, Monday, September 6, 1976. These notices appear to 
be a last minute attempt at compliance but cover only one 11 
day period and not the required four weeks. Such "publi-
cation" is insufficient to give notice of a hearing under 
the statute but is more inadequate still in this case 
because it also had to correct the previous misleading 
notice. 
Defendants-respondents asserts (Brief of Respondent 
at page 11) that the affidavits of publication show publi-
cation on five different dates. Examination of the affidavit 
reveal that the two notices were of different hearing dates. 
(Exhibits F 1 & 2). Such inconsistency defeats the purpose 
of giving notice. These notices are not to be considered as 
one act of publication but, rather two very separate acts. 
Because they publicized two completely separate hearings, a 
proper second notice was still more imperative to correct 
the first. 
The Florida Supreme Court in Baycol, Inc. v. 
Downtown Development Authority, 315 S. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975) 
made clear that when an eminent domain action is being 
-13-
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cunsidered strict compliance with statutory procedures is 
required. Baycol should apply in this case, for to allow 
less than strict construction would be to thwart clear 
legislative intent. 
The issue of the use of the police power to effect 
an urban renewal program through eminent domain is a serious 
intrusion of due process rights for the individual. Because 
of the seriousness of such an action, due process rights 
must be strictly observed. Only strict compliance with the 
processes mandated by legislative grant will be sufficient 
to preserve those rights. 
Although the use of the police pofier to affect 
zoning is a less significant intrusion into the rights of 
the individual, the courts have chosen in such cases to 
require strict compliance with the statutory grant of power. 
Though a change in zoning will not mandate that a person 
leave his home or neighborhood, the courts have still chosen 
to carefully preserve the individual's rights. In Hart v. 
Bayless Investment & Trading Co., 346 P.2d 1101 (Arizona 
1959) the courts found that: 
This Court has held that, where a juris-
dictional notice is required to be given 
in a certain manner, any means other than 
that described is ineffective (citations 
omitted) . This is so even though the 
intended recipient of that notice does 
in fact acquire the knowledge contem-
plated by the law. 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. . . This Court has shown a pre-
dilection in analogous cases to demand 
strict compliance with statutory require-
ments concerning the zoning aspect of the 
police power. (Id. at 1108 1109). 
Lack of statutory notice has been found to be a 
jurisdictional defect which renders action by a zoning 
authority void, Pima County v. Clapp, 530 P.2d 1119 (Ct. 
App. Arizona 1975). In that case the county appealed from 
an order of the Superior Court directing said County to 
process a plan for development of a certain tract that the 
County had rezoned to prohibit land uses which were proposed 
in the plat. The court required that the County conform to 
a mailing of notice "in addition'' to other notice because 
mailing was al~o required in the statute. The court held 
that failure to follow the legislative standards rendered 
the action invalid. See Pima at 1122. Lack of statutory 
notice means lack of strict compliance with statutory guide-
lines for notice required for eminent domain action and so 
should have no less serious result than the invalidity of 
the action. 
It cannot be argued that the Murray City Commission 
even substantially complied with the requirements of notice. 
The language of the statute is clear and specific and sus-
ceptible to precise interpretation. Requiring that notice 
be by publication once a week for four weeks has a valid 
basis and is not arbitrary. No one would be expected to be 
-15-
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ready to present a case without adequate time to prepare. 
Utah Code Annotated §11-19-17, 1953, as amended requires the 
objections to a proposed redevelopment to be filed in 
writing. The legislative body is then required to hear and 
pass on all objections. Four weeks is a good estimate of 
the time required. In Re Phillips Estate, 44 P.2d 699 
(1935) spelled out clearly the Utah standard for "successive 
weeks", to wit: 
Successive weeks. .means successive 
weeks commencing with a Sunday after the 
first week commencing with a Sunday in 
which the first publication appeared. 
Supra. at page 704. 
The notice given in this case did not conform to 
this requirement. The city misconstrues the meaning of the 
statute in order to assert its compliance. Two papers 
giving different dates for the hearing will not meet the 
requirement. The publication in the Murray Eagle was of a 
hearing date which was never held. There was no retraction 
or amendment made in that notice in the Murray Eagle and so 
anyone who might have seen the original notice was effectively 
denied the purpose for notice. The statutory requirement of 
four publications once per week is especially important in 
this case because the erroneous information required cor-
rection. 
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Defendants-respondents states at page 12 of thei, 
brief that "substantial compliance" is the proper standard 
for the trial court to apply to the present case and quote; 
Beck v. Ransome-Crummy Co., 42 Cal. App. 764, 184 P. 431 
(Calif. 1919), to-wit: 
If, either in the summons or in the resolt 
tion, there is not an entire omission of a 
statutory requirement, but merely a defect, 
a court may properly determine there has or 
has not been a substantial compliance with 
the statute dependent upon the facts of the 
particular case. .This judgment of 
what is a substantial compliance with the 
statute is to be exercised in the first 
instance by the trial court. If the case is 
one where a requirement of the statute has 
not been entirely disregarded, its [the 
trial court's] determination of the questi~ 
of substantial compliance ought to be con-
trolling in the absence of discretion. 
(Id at page 434) (Brief of Defendant at 12) 
However, defendants-respondents did not quote thE 
complete paragraph. The preceding sentences state: 
Where a clear statutory requirement is 
omitted from the initial resolution or 
process which is the means of imparting 
notice of adverse proceedings, the rule of 
liberal construction must yield to the 
constitutional guarantee of due process 
of law. Courts cannot in a particular 
case dispense with any element of notice 
which the Legislature has enacted shall 
be given in all similar cases. Beck 
supra at page 434) (emphasis added)-:-
Should there have been any question of the court' 
intent it 1 'f' was c ari ied in Fidelity v. Deposit Company of 
Maryland v. Claude Fisher Co., 327 P.2d 78 (2nd Dist. Ct. 
Appeals Calif., 1958). Although a contract case, the court 
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cited Beck, supra, to support its statement that: "Statutes 
of limitation and the like, prescribing definite periods of 
time within which actions may be brought or certain steps 
taken are, of necessity, adamant rather than flexible in 
nature." (at page 81). 
Defendants-respondents did not meet the required 
slandard of strict compliance nor did defendants-respondents 
act in even substantial compliance adequate to support the 
legislative intent. Therefore, the trial court acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in granting summary judgment to 
defendants-respondents. Inadequate notice is a jurisdictional 
defect which should void the action, as stated in Hart supra 
at 1108: 
In other jurisdictions, courts which have 
been confronted with this issue have found, 
almost without exception, that compliance 
with statutory requirements as to hearing 
and notice is jurisdictional and that 
ordinances which have not been adopted in 
conformity with the enabling act are void. 
Hurst v. City of Burlingams, 207 Cal. 134, 
277 P. 308; Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 
382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 238; Rhode Island 
Home Builders v. Budlong Rose Co., 77 R.I. 
147, 74 A.2d 237; Treat v. Town Plan & 
Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 136, 139 
A.2d 601; Gendron v. Borough of Naugatuck, 
supra. (See also Pima County at 1122.) 
Although defendants-respondents seeks to dis-
tinguish Hart on the basis of different code requirements 
and distinctions in the statute, the language of the Hart 
Court was never intended to be strictly on those facts, and 
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actually expresses the ideas of strict compliance to what-
ever the legislative restriction. 
By the Zoning Act, certain authority was 
conferred upon the Board, but subject to 
those express conditions imposed by the 
same Act. An attempted exercise of that 
authority without compliance with the 
statutory conditions precedent is utterly 
void and of no effect. It is true that 
where there is no factual evidence pre-
sented to show that such an ordinance was 
not properly adopted, such an enactment is 
entitled to the presumption of regularity 
which attaches to all official acts (cita-
tions omitted). However, when, as here, 
facts are shown which rebut that pre-
sumption, the courts will exercise their 
jurisdiction to determine whether the 
necessary statutory prerequisites have 
been complied with. Hart, supra. at 1105 
(emphasis added). ~~ 
Hart would be applicable to the case at hand and 
would demand compliance to whatever statutory conditions had 
been given. 
B. The Redevelopment Agency has not included in 
their report a relocation plan as required 
under Section 11-19-14(4), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended in 1971, nor has 
the Murray City Commission complied with 
Utah Code Annotated §§11-19-21 (5) (g) or 
11-19-21 (5) (h) or 11-19-21 (6). 
Because of the seriousness of the use of eminent 
domain under the police power great protections must be 
provided the property owners. Section 11-19-14(4) Utah Code 
Annotated reads in pertinent part: 
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Every project area redevelopment plan shall 
be accompanied by a report containing: 
. (4) A method or plan for the-re-
location of families and persons to be 
temporarily or permanently displaced from 
housing facilities, if any, in the project 
area. 
The Neighborhood Development Plan contains a per-
functory attempt to meet the requirements, to-wit: 
4. A method or plan for the relocation 
of families and persons to be temporarily 
or permanently displaced from housing 
facilities, if any, in the project area. 
During the annual increment from 
July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1979, there will 
be relocation activities. The Agency shall 
comply with the federal Uniform Relocation 
Act as adopted in 1971 and amended from 
time to time and the State Relocation Act. 
We will work to replace the displaced 
resident within the area of Murray City 
to minimize the social hardship. (Exhibit 
1 of the Neighborhood Development Plan) . 
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act is explicit 
in its requirements of what must be shown before the plan is 
adopted: 
11-19-21 Adoption of ordinance - Contents. 
--The ordinance shall contain: 
... (5) The findings and determinations 
of the legislative body based upon fact 
that: 
... (g) The agency has a feasiable 
method or plan for the relocation of 
families and persons displaced from the 
project area, if the redevelopment plan 
may result in the temporary or permanent 
displacement of any occupants of housing 
facilities in the project area, and 
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(h) There are or are being provi~ 
in the project area or in other areas not 
generally less desirable in regard to p~ 
utilities and public and conunercial facii 
and at rents or prices within the financ1 
means of the families and persons displac 
from the project area, decent, safe and 
sanitary dwelling equal in number to the 
number of and available to such displaced 
families and persons and reasonably acces 
to their places of employment; and 
(6) A statement that the legislativ 
body is satisfied permanent housing f acil 
will be available within three years frorr 
the time occupants of the project area ar 
displaced and that pending the developmen 
such facilities there will be available 
to such displaced occupants adequate 
temporary housing facilities at rents con 
parable to those in the conununity at the 
time of their displacement. 
The simple statement in the Neighborhood Developmen 
Plan that they "shall comply" with the law cannot serve as 
a "method or plan" of relocation. The Federal Uniform 
Relocation Act and State Relocation Acts do not set up plans 
but provide onJy general and minimal guidelines. To state 
as part of a plan of relocation that these Acts will be 
utilized is absurd. The point of the statute was not to 
encourage repetition of generalizations but to require 
development and implementation of a detailed plan. 
It is readily apparent that no plan has been 
formulated. The June 1, 1976 plan (Exhibit I) stated that 
approximately 1,000 people live within the project area. 
The "majority" of those people were said to be between 55 
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and 75 years old and limited to two per household. Only 
25 were said to be families with young children. Finally, 
it stated that there was a limited amount of housing avail-
able in the area. The redevelopment agency provides for 
relocation only of five families. If the purpose of re-
location is to protect all displaced persons, it would be 
unreasonable to conclude that relocation of five families is 
adequate in light of the foregoing statistics. The remainder 
of the 1,000 people are not considered at any point in the 
plan. Leaving that number of people unprovided and unaccounted 
for is contrary to the intent of the Legislature. 
Special care should be taken in this case because 
of the predominance of elderly persons in the project area. 
Relocation is difficult enough for a young person in the 
flux of his life, but may be lifethreatening to an elderly 
resident who has established himself in an area. Established 
habits and patterns are important to the elderly. Many of 
these people have neighbors and friends who are now able to 
provide company as well as provide an assurance that someone 
will be available to help should an accident occur. Many of 
the elderly in the area have the opportunity to live with 
family members. Relocation plans have not made provision to 
maintain these extended families. 
It is interesting to note that at page 10 of the 
Neighborhood Development Plan, the Agency is to begin planning 
housing for senior citizens because of the number of elderly 
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who reside there. Yet it is said only five families will 
need relocating. There is nothing in the record to prove 
that any contact has been made with the residents. No 
offers have been shown and no statements have been made in 
the Neighborhood Development Plan (Exhibit I) that indicate 
an awareness of the problem. The record shows that the 
agency did not comply with the Utah Neighborhood Developmeru 
Act, Utah Code Annotated §11-19-1 et. seq. 
The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in Katsen v. 
Coleman, 530 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1976) held that the Missouri 
S~ate Highway Department and chief engineer adequately 
complied with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real 
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 which required thE 
state to provide federal agencies with "satisfactory assurm 
that adequate redevelopment assistance and replacement 
dwellings would be available for displaced persons. In that 
case the plan which was held to be "adequate" was far more 
extensive than the general statement of this case. The 
Agency had already: (1) relocated 1,612 persons, (2) 
moved 420 homes, (3) relocated four businesses, and (4) 
did all relocating in light of a study done by (a) inter-
viewing relocatees, {b) spot check of 5% of the housing a~ 
(c) checking the availability of housing, id. at page 180. 
-23-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Agency actions in this case do not provide 
a method or plan for relocation. That alone is sufficient 
basis upon which to overturn the lower court ruling because 
it is arbitrary and capricious to rule in favor of an agency 
which has not complied strictly with its legislative grant 
of power. Such an omission from the plan is prejudicial to 
the substantive rights of the parties here involved. 
C. Murray City and the Redevelopment Agency 
have not complied with UCA 11-19-10 and 
11-19-12 requiring a separate plan for each 
project area. 
The Redevelopment Project has been designated two 
target areas for redevelopment but the areas are not treated 
separately. UCA 11-19-10 states in pertinent part: 
.the agency shall select one or more project 
areas comprising all or part of such redevelopment 
survey area, and formulate a preliminary plan 
for the redevelopment of each project area in 
cooperation with the planning commission of the 
community. (Emphasis added) 
11-19-12 UCA, states: 
The agency shall prepare or cause to be prepared 
a redevelopment plan for each project area and 
for that purpose shall hold public hearings and 
may conduct examinations, investigations and 
other negotiations. 
These sections require plans for each separate 
project area. The single plan in this instance does not 
meet such a standard. There is but a single set of statis-
tics, street development plans, population densities and 
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building intensities generalized for both areas. The 
statistics of the two areas cannot feasibly be the same and 
an average is inaccurate. The areas are six blocks apart 
at their closest point and differ greatly in density, land 
use and undoubtedly, the instance of "blight". 
To treat the areas together thwarts legislative 
intent. The purpose in requiring specifics for each area is 
that each will, and should, be separately considered. 
Defects or flaws in intended use or, in this case, existence 
of blight may void one proposal yet not affect another. 
Likewise, statistics may be in excess of 90% in one area for 
crime, delinquency, infant mortality, etc. but minimal for 
another, yet if the two are combined, the statistics as to 
the extent of deterioration will be high enough to cause 
alarm. The only protection against such abuse is strict 
compliance with the requirement of separate plans. 
There is no plan in the record for Area 2 except 
the general plan found in Areas for 1 and 2. The specific 
requirements of the Code cannot be fulfilled in such a 
general way. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should overrule the lower court's grant 
of summary judgment because such grant was arbitrary and 
capricious. The lower court was not supported in a finding 
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that defendants-respondents had established a condition of 
blight. The defendants-respondents did not comply with the 
statutory mandates for forumulation of a redevelopment plan 
and so were without jurisdiction to carry out that plan. 
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